Constitutional Law -- The Anti-Injunction Act -- Due Process Considerations Where IRS Actions Threaten First Amendment Liberties -- Bob Jones University v. Simon; Alexander v.  Americans United  Inc. by Shea, Richard J
Boston College Law Review
Volume 16
Issue 2 Number 2 Article 6
1-1-1975
Constitutional Law -- The Anti-Injunction Act --
Due Process Considerations Where IRS Actions
Threaten First Amendment Liberties -- Bob Jones
University v. Simon; Alexander v. "Americans
United" Inc.
Richard J. Shea
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Education Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Religion Law Commons,
and the Tax Law Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard J. Shea, Constitutional Law -- The Anti-Injunction Act -- Due Process Considerations Where IRS
Actions Threaten First Amendment Liberties -- Bob Jones University v. Simon; Alexander v. "Americans
United" Inc., 16 B.C.L. Rev. 266 (1975), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol16/iss2/6
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Jacquelin may be likely to protect the defendant in Rule 23(b)(3)
class actions from being forced to settle for financial reasons, this
desirable result may well be at the cost of foreclosing the use of the
class action as a means by which the small claimant can seek
redress. If the Court had construed the notice provision in Rule
23(c)(2) as stating that the form of notice should be a discretionary
consideration rather than that individual notice to each identifiable
member is always required, the desirable result with respect to the
defendant might have been achieved in a manner that was less
damaging to the small claimant's position.
LUCY WEST BEHYMER
Constitutional Law—The Anti-Injunction Act—Due Process Con-
siderations Where IRS Actions Threaten First Amendment Liber-
ties: Bob Jones University v. Simonil Alexander v. "Americans
United" inc. 2—Petitioner Bob Jones University, a religious institu-
tion, sought to enjoin the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from
revoking petitioner's status as a tax-exempt organization under sec-
tion 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 3
 (the Code)
because of its segregationist admissions policy. 4
 Respondent in Alex-
ander v. "Americans United" Inc. 5
 sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief to restore its section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status, which the
IRS had revoked because of the organization's substantial lobbying
activities. 6
 Restoration not only would shield respondent from fed-
eral taxation but also would insure that future contributors be
permitted to deduct contributions under section 170 of the Code.?
' 416 U.S, 725 (1974).
2
 416 U.S. 752 (1974). The full name of the organization is "Protestants and Other
Americans United for Separation of Church and State," Id. at 754.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 501(cX3). This section of the Code exempts from federal
income taxation, inter alia, corporations and organizations "organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals . . • ." Id. However, the tax
exemption is provided only where profits do not inure to private gain and "no substantial part
of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation . . . ." Id.
4
 Bob Jones Univ, v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 735 (1974).
416 U.S. 752 (1974).
6
 Id. at 754-55. The organization's lobbying activities were evidently consonant with its
purpose, described by the Court as the defense and maintenance of "religious liberty in the
United States by the dissemination of knowledge concerning the constitutional principle of the
separation of church and State." Id. at 754. See note 25 infra.
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 170. Section 170 of the Code provides for the deductibility of
charitable contributions. Generally, an organization qualifying under § 501(cX3) will qualify
as a charitable organization under § 170(cX2). Loss of * 501(cX3) status, therefore, almost
automatically removes contributions which had been deductible under § 170 from qualifica-
tion for deduction on contributors' federal income tax returns, Thus, "(tJhe differences be-
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Both Bob Jones University and Americans United argued that ir-
reparable injury would result from the IRS action. Furthermore, the
two organizations contended that the IRS conduct would result in
violations of due process, equal protection and First Amendment
rights. The United States Supreme Court HELD in both cases:
actions to restrain revocation of section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status
or to obtain restoration of such status are suits to restrain the
collection of taxes. 8 Consequently, the suits brought by Bob Jones
University and Americans United were barred by the Anti-
Injunction Act of 1867. 9 The Court reasoned that both organizations
had failed to show that the government would not ultimately prevail.
on the merits, and thus could not place their cases within the
recognized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act (the Act). 10 There-
fore, the Court decided that their allegations of irreparable injury
and of the unconstitutionality of the IRS actions were insufficient to
invoke the federal equity jurisdiction.'
Initially, this note will discuss the lower court decisions which
held that actions to enjoin the revocation of section 501(c)(3) status
were not suits to enjoin the collection of taxes within the meaning of
the Anti-Injunction Act and therefore were maintainable. 12 The
Supreme Court's conclusion that any suit with a potentially negative
impact on the revenues falls within the Act's prohibition will then be
examined in detail. Subsequently, the Court's interpretation of the
anti-injunction statute will be discussed in light of Supreme Court
interpretations of the Act's legislative history and the Court's previ-
ous constructions of the statutory provisions. Finally, the Court's
application of the Anti-Injunction Act in Bob Jones University and
Americans United will be analyzed in light of principles of due
process established in cases where First Amendment liberties are
infringed by administrative actions.
I. DECISIONS BELOW
Bob Jones University is an eleemosynary corporation, founded
to promulgate fundamentalist religious beliefs. A basic tenet of the
faith sponsored by the University is that segregation of the races is
tween the requirements of §§ 501(c)(3) and 170(c)(2) are minor and are not involved in this
litigation." Americans United, 416 U.S. at 754 n.2.
" Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 739; Americans United, 416 U.S. at 760-61.
9 Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 749; Americans United, 416 U.S. at 763. The Anti-
Injunction Act, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7421(a) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 2, 1867,
ch. 169 § 10, 14 Stat. 475), provides that ". . no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or
not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed."
10 Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 748-49; American United, 416 U.S. at 763.
" Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 748-49; Americans United, 416 U.S. at 763.
11
 Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 341 F. Supp. 277, 283-84 (D.S.C. 1971); "Americans
United" Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169, 1179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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divinely ordained, a precept conscientiously reflected in the school's
admissions policy.' 3
The University's tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) was
secure until 1970. At that time, the Internal Revenue Service an-
nounced that tax exemptions would no longer be available to educa-
tional institutions discriminating on the basis of race." In 1970 and
1971 the IRS, seeking modification of the school's admissions policy,
conducted unsuccessful negotiations with the University. 15
In September 1971, prior to IRS initiation of administrative
action to deprive the school of its section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status
and its donors of advance assurance of the deductibility of their
contributions under section 170, Bob Jones University sought an
injunction in federal district court to restrain the IRS action. The
government moved to dismiss on the basis of the Anti-Injunction
Act, which prohibits (with explicit exceptions 16 not relevant to the
case) the maintenance of any "suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax."" Finding that the University
sought relief from "what it contends to be illegal and unconstitu-
tional actions or threatened actions"" by federal officials rather than
the restraint of taxation, the district court in Bob Jones University
held that jurisdiction for the action was not withdrawn by the Act,
and granted a temporary injunction. °
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that since the
necessary result of an injunction preserving the University's section
501(c)(3) status was a restraint upon taxation of its income or of its
donors' income, the Anti-Injunction Act barred injunctive relief. 20
Furthermore, the court of appeals held that since the University
could not show that "under no circumstances could the Government
13 Since its founding in 1927, the University has excluded black persons from the student
body. "On pain of expulsion students are prohibited from interracial dating, and petitioner
believes it would be impossible to enforce this prohibition absent the exclusion of Negroes."
Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 735. For a further discussion of the University and its policies
see Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 341 F. Supp. 277, 278-79 (D.S.C. 1971).
ReNi. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 Cum. Bull. 230. The IRS change of policy was prompted in
part by a successful suit brought by black students and parents against grants of tax
exemptions to segregated "private academies." Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150
(B.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Colt v, Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). The Supreme Court's
affirmance is of questionable value as precedent due to the change of position of the IRS
pending review. Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 740 n.11.
13 See Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 341 F. Supp. 277, 279-80 (D.S.C. 1971).
16
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7421(a) acknowledges the authorization by Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 7426(b) of injunctive relief for a third party where the United States levies against
property in which the third party has superior rights and where the levy threatens irreparable
injury to those rights. Section 7421(a) also carves out an exception for Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 6213(a), which authorizes restraints on assessments of deficiences or levies where the
taxpayer has filed a timely petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of tax deficiency.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7421(a).
I° 341 F. Supp. at 283.
19
 Id. at 285.
2° Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 472 F.2d 903, 905-06 (4th Cir. 1973).
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ultimately prevail" in the litigation,n the case was not within the
recognized exception to the Act. 22
In the Americans United case, the respondent organization also
had qualified for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) and for
deductibility of charitable contributions under section 170. 23 In
1969, the organization's substantial lobbying activities caused the
IRS to revoke the exemption and deductibility privileges. 24 Subse-
quently, the IRS issued a ruling letter 25 certifying that the respon-
dent qualified for exemption from income taxation as a "social
welfare" organization under section 501(c)(4). 26 By 1970 the actions
of the IRS allegedly had "dried up its well of contributory resources
to such an extent that [Americans United] operated at a deficit for
the first time in its history . . . ." 27 In July 1970, Americans United
and several persons expressing an intention to donate if deductibility
were guaranteed filed suit in federal district court. The plaintiffs
sought both a declaratory judgment holding the lobbying proscrip-
tion of section 501(c)(3) unconstitutional, and injunctive relief aimed
at restoration of exemption and deductibility status. 28 The IRS
obtained dismissal of the case in an unpublished order 29 relying on
the Anti-Injunction Act and the exception to jurisdiction under the
Declaratory Judgment Act for cases "with respect to Federal taxes
1 ,30
.	 .	 .	 .
The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed dismissal with re-
spect to the prospective contributors and held that they were seeking
restraints on tax liability, relief proscribed by the Anti-Injunction
and Declaratory Judgment Acts. 3 ' The court, however, interpreted
21 Id. at 906, quoting Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7
(1962),
22 472 F.2d at 906-07.
23 416 U.S. at 754.
24 "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
25 Americans United, 416 U.S. at 755. The IRS maintained that "[t]he majority of the
corporation's activities were . .. in furtherance of the following goals., 'the mobilization of
public opinion; resisting every attempt by law or the administration of law which widens the
breach in the wall of separation of church and state; working for the repeal of any existing
state law which sanctions the granting of public aid to church schools; and uniting all
"patriotic" citizens in a concerted effort to prevent the passage of any federal law allotting,
directly or indirectly, federal education funds to church schools.' " "Americans United" Inc. v,
Walters, 477 F.2d at 1172.
2° Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 501(cX4), which exemption includes "[c]ivic leagues or
organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social
welfare . . . ." Contributions to a § 501(cX4) organization ordinarily are ineligible for
deductibility under § 170. See Americans United, 416 U.S. at 755.
27 "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d at 1172-73.
2° Id. at 1173-74
29
 Id. at 1174,
30
 28 U S.C. § 2201 (1970). "In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction except
with respect to Federal taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate
pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." Id.
31 477 F.2d at 1176-77. The court also stated that the prohibition with respect to taxes
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these statutes as precluding relief only where the plaintiff's "primary
design" was to restrain taxation. 32 Since the primary design of
Americans United, in contrast to that of the individual contributors,
was not to restrain taxation but "to avoid the disposition of contrib-
uted funds away from the corporation," 33 the court of appeals
reversed and remanded with respect of the plaintiff organization. 34
II. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
The threshold question to be answered by the Supreme Court
was whether jurisdiction for the actions brought by Bob Jones
University and Americans United was prohibited by the Anti-
Injunction Act because the suits were "for the purpose of restraining
the assessment or collection of any tax."35 The District of Columbia
Circuit's interpretation of "purpose" equated that term with the
motive of the plaintiff. 36 Under this interpretation, if the organiza-
tion had brought the action in order to restain directly the assess-
ment of taxes against it, the Act would be applicable and would
withdraw equitable jurisdiction." Furthermore, if a person sued in
the stead of another to restrain the assessment of a tax indirectly
burdensome to the plaintiff (e.g., a shareholder suit on behalf of a
reluctant corporation; a consumer seeking to restrain a tax imposed
at the manufacturing level), the Act would bar the action." Where,
however, there is evidence that the plaintiff's "primary design,"
such as the preservation of Americans United's organizational vital-
ity, is not to restrain tax collection, but necessarily includes such
restraint, the suit would not be termed for the "purpose" of
restraint. 39 The federal district court in Bob Jones University
adopted a similar rationale. 4° In as much as the school's motive was
"to enjoin the defendants from exercising alleged illegal and ultra
vices power and authority . . . the levy, assessment, and collection
of a tax is not the main issue."41
contained in the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, though literally broader than
the Anti-Injunction Act, was coterminous in scope. Id. at 1175-76. See McGlotten v. Connal-
ly, 338 F. Supp. 448, 452-53 (D.D,C. 1972).
32 477 F.2d at 1177-79.
33 Id. at 1178-79.
34 Id. at 1179-81.
35
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7421(a). Assuming that the Declaratory Judgment Act's
prohibition, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, was at least as restrictive as that of the Anti-Injunction Act,
the Court based its decision on § 7421(a), not reaching the issue of the Declaratory Judgment
Act's arguably more stringent provisions. 416 U.S. at 759 n.10.
36 Americans United, 477 F.2d at 1169.
37 Id. at 1179.
3 ° See id. at 1179-80.
39 Id. at 1178-80.
" 341 F. Supp. at 283.
41 Id. Judge Boreman, dissenting in Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 472 F.2d 903 (4th Cir.
1973), would examine the motives of the IRS in removing the University's tax privileges. Id.
at 908. Because the government was not primarily concerned with the collection of revenue
270
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The equation of the statutory term "purpose" with the motive
of the plaintiffs did not survive Supreme Court review. While the
motive of Americans United may have been self-preservation, the
Supreme Court concluded that its "objective" in bringing suit was to
"restore advance assurance that donations to it would qualify as
charitable deductions," thereby preventing the IRS from collecting
taxes on that portion of contributors' incomes exempted from federal
income tax by the deduction. 42 The organization's argument that it
sought merely to preserve its viability by avoidance of the diversion
of tax-deductible gifts was found to be merely an indirect statement
of its desire to remove the burden of taxation from contributors. 43
Since the relief sought was the restraint of taxation, the Court
concluded that the "purpose" of the suit was the restraint of
taxation."
In Bob Jones University the school would have been exposed to
liability for over one million dollars in income taxes for the period
during which the IRS was enjoined from removing its section
501(c)(3) shield. 45 The Court therefore dismissed the University's
claim that the Anti-Injunction Act was inapplicable, noting that this
major tax liability and its allegedly disastrous impact on the school
left "little doubt that a primary purpose of this lawsuit is to prevent
the Service from assessing and collecting income taxes from
petitioner."46
Although in some contexts "motive," "intent" or "primary de-
sign" may be synonymous with "purpose," it is suggested that the
but with using the tax power to force adherence to "political or social guidelines," an action to
restrain the IRS would not interfere with "prompt collection of its lawful revenue" and
therefore would not be prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act.
This argument echoes the reasoning of the line of cases in the 1920's holding that
collection of a tax which was a "penalty" might be enjoined despite the Anti-Injunction Act.
E.g., Regal Drug Co. v. Wardell, 260 U.S. 386, 392 (1922); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557,
562 (1922). Finding that the taxes assessed in each case were penalties imposed to punish
illegal acts, the Court held that Congress may not autborize summary tax proceedings to
evade the requirements of procedural due process in criminal cases. 260 U.S. at 392; 259 U.S.
at 562. One may speculate that the Court was concerned more with substantive than
procedural due process, and that it was as vigilant to thwart the indirect exercise of uncon-
stitutional regulatory power as it was committed to strike down the direct exercise of such
power. See Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
The concept that a tax is not actually a tax where it is a penalty or used for regulatory
purposes is of doubtful validity today. See Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513
(1937). See also United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 27-28 (1953); United States v.
DiPrimio, 209 F. Supp, 137, 138 (W.D. Pa, 1962).
42 416 U.S. at 760-61.
43
 Id. at 761.
44
 Id. at 760-61. The Injunction sought by Americans United would also shield the
organization from its new unemployment insurance tax liability under Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 3301, Id. at 755. Deciding that the Anti-Injunction Act was applicable despite the motives
of Americans United with respect to restraint of third parties' tax liability, the Court did not
comment at length on the question of the Act's applicability where the effect of the injunction
was to shield the plaintiff from direct, albeit miniscule, tax liability. Id. at 760.
43 Id. at 738.
46 Id.
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Court's equation of "purpose of restraining" with the negative im-
pact of the relief sought on revenue collection in the context of tax
injunctions, is preferable. The lower courts' attempts to isolate a
limited class of cases where the plaintiff's goal—for example, the
vindication of a legal or constitutional right—is distinguishable from
his means of achieving the goal—the restraint of tax liability—is
grounded on a meaningless distinction, which would enable plain-
tiffs who plead a "purpose" other than the restraint of taxation to
evade the Act's proscription. 47 A plaintiff whose goal is merely the
restraint of taxation, and who seeks injunctive relief to achieve that
goal, would suffer dismissal of his suit even in the absence of the
Anti-Injunction Act. No court of equity could entertain a prayer to
restrain taxation absent the plaintiff's allegations that the tax was
illegal." Therefore, in any non-frivolous suit, the plaintiff's desire to
remedy the violation of a legal right would be a requirement for
injunctive relief. Thus, it appears that the lower courts had created
a distinction without a difference and that the Supreme Court was
correct in finding both actions, prima facie, within the language of
the Act barring suits to restrain taxation.
The soundness of Supreme Court's test of impact upon revenue
collection is more evident upon further examination of the lower
courts' attempts to isolate those cases where the "primary design" of
a suit is other than to restrain taxation. It is submitted that the
motives of taxpayers cannot be usefully categorized as "primary" or
otherwise. Rather, they range along a continuum, with a desire to
restrain based on greed or impure motive at one end, and a desire to
restrain based on, perhaps, a concern for the integrity of the con-
stitution at the other. Purity of motive, then, would seem to be the
operative test where the objective is a determination primary de-
sign. If a pure motive would bring the action out of the scope of the
Anti-Injunction Act, then any action, based as it must be on allega-
tions of illegality or unconstitutionality, could be maintained
through artful pleading of motives. An impossible task would
thereby be created for judges and an irresistible loophole for inven-
tive litigants. Who is to say, for example, that Bob Jones
University's concern is less with its tax bill and more with its
abhorrence of unconstitutional administrative actions?
The facts of Americans United and the opinion of the court of
appeals" present a further illustration of the propriety of the Su-
preme Court's test which measures "purpose" by the potential im-
pact of the suit on the revenues. The District of Columbia Circuit's
decision created a paradoxical situation where a third party would
See Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 341 F. Supp. 277, 282-84 (D.S.C. 1971); "Ameri-
cans United" Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169, 1177-80 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
ae See Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine, 284 U.S. 498, 509 (1932); 4 J. Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence § 1779-80, at 4144 (4th ed. 1919).
49 "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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have standing to contest the tax liability of a taxpayer while the
taxpayer was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act." The lower court
had no difficulty concluding that the Anti-Injunction Act would bar
such indirect actions as a shareholder suing to shield a corporation
from liability if "the tax itself directly operates to place a financial
burden upon the non-taxpayer . . . ." 51 A shareholder sues to
restrain taxation of the corporation because, if it is not restrained,
the operation of predictable economic forces will depress the value
of stock and reduce dividends. In the light of this analysis, the
District of Columbia Circuit's conclusion that the suit brought by
Americans United was not such an indirect action appeared errone-
ous. Americans United sued because predictable economic forces
had caused donors to cease contributing once deductibility of their
gifts was revoked. Like the hypothetical shareholder, Americans
United was a third party suffering indirect economic injuries at-
tributable to the burden of a tax imposed upon another. The only
distinguishing characteristics between the grievances of the donor
and the shareholder are the tax assessment's larger quantitative
impact on the donee and the donee's motive. The shareholder may
be motivated primarily by concern for his pocketbook, while Ameri-
cans United may have been motivated more by the serious threat to
its organizational existence. As noted, 52 however, under these recent
Supreme Court decisions, the motive of the plaintiff cannot place an
action outside the scope of the Act's prohibition of suits for the
"purpose" of restraining taxation. 53
It is also suggested that the Supreme Court's equation of "pur-
pose" with effect on the revenues is - consistent with previous con-
structions of the statute by the Court. It has been unequivocally
stated that the intent of Congress in enacting the Anti-Injunction
Act was to isolate the federal tax collection process from judicial
interference, and thereby to protect the integrity of the treasury."
Accordingly, a construction of the Act which brings within its scope
any action, the necessary result of which is to impair the collection
of taxes or reduce the revenues, is in conformity with the legislative
intent as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Moreover, because
there is no evidence 55 that the draftsmen of the Anti-Injunction Act
intended to permit exceptions based on plaintiffs' motivation, a
construction of the Act which, on that basis, excludes suits from its
coverage is not in conformity with the intent of Congress as uni-
54/ Id. at 1176-80.
51
 Id. at 1180.
'2 See text at notes 42-44 supra.
53
 Irrespective of motive, it is submitted that due process requires an exception to the Act
where IRS actions threaten irreparable harm and infringe on fundamental rights. See text at
notes 113-49 infra.
54
 E.g., Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962); State
Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 613-14 (1876).
5 See note 79, infra.
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formly interpreted by the Court. Thus, the Supreme Court interpre-
tation, that Bob Jones University's and Americans United's suits are
"for the purpose of restraining" within the meaning of the Anti-
Injunction Act, 56 is consistent with prior decisions interpreting the
intent of Congress. 57
Finally, policy considerations support the Court's construction
of the term "purpose." An interpretation of the Act permitting a
donee to obtain pre-collection injunctive relief and to litigate the
deductibility of donors' gifts would pose a greater threat to the
revenues than the more ordinary case where the taxpayer sues to
shield himself from taxation. In the latter case, the plaintiff, after an
adverse judgment, would ordinarily be required (and solvent) to pay
his taxes, liability for which had been suspended during the litiga-
tion. However, where a donee such as Americans United or Bob
Jones University obtains a preliminary injunction to preserve ad-
vance assurance by the IRS of deductibility of contributions, a
donor, relying on that assurance, cannot, after judgment for the
government, be held liable retroactively for disallowed deductions.
Otherwise the preliminary injunction would be a nullity providing
no assurance to prospective donors.
56 Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 738-41; Americans United, 416 U.S. at 759-61. The
Court thus adopted an effect on the revenues test to delineate the scope of the Anti-Injunction
Act. See Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 738-39; Americans United, 416 U.S. at 760. Therefore,
lawsuits which seek judicial interference with IRS administrative procedures, but which have
no negative effect on tax collection apparently may be maintained. Thus, actions such as
Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404
U.S. 997 (1971), where black students and their parents successfully sought to enjoin the grant
of 501(cX3) status to a segregationist private school, would not be prohibited because their
impact on the revenues would be positive rather than negative. For the same reason, Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973), where plaintiffs
successfully challenged an IRS ruling, allowing non-profit hospitals to qualify as charitable
organizations without requiring the hospitals to offer special financial consideration to indi-
gents, was outside the scope of the Anti-Injunction Act.
The net effect on the revenues test thus gives rise to the paradoxical situation where an
organization denied 501(c)(3) status has no prepayment remedy in the courts, while a third
party's suit to restrain a grant of an exemption could be entertained. The paradox arises,
however, not from an infirmity in interpretation, but from the statute itself.
Perhaps recognizing the inevitability of a net effect on the revenues test, the University
and Americans United argued that removal of their 501(cX3) status would not result in
increased revenues, since donors would divert their largesse to organizations retaining deduc-
tible status. The Supreme Court found such an argument "too speculative" because of its
assumption that all contributors would desert the formerly § 501(cX3) organization. 416 U.S.
at 739 n.10. To the extent that donors failed to desert the organization, the injunction would
serve to restrain taxation. Id. The Court's reasoning on this point is compatible with an
analogous rule for assigning the burden of proof in tax injunction cases. In an action where a
taxpayer seeks to restrain the collection of a tax within the scope of the Anti-Injunction Act,
the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the case falls within the recognized exception to the
statute. Lucia v. United States, 474 F.2d 565, 576 (5th Cir. 1973). Logically, one seeking to
show that the action is, in the first instance, outside the scope of the statute, should have the
burden of proof.
57 For an analysis of the meaning of "purpose" within the context of the Act which agrees
with the District of Columbia Circuit's interpretation, see Americans United, 416 U.S. at 763
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
The Court's determination that both Bob Jones University and
Americans United were suits "for the purpose of restraining" taxa-
tion, raised the issue whether either organization qualified for the
recognized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. In the most recent
case in which the Court interpreted the Act and that exception,
Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co.," no troublesome
constitutional issues were presented. A corporation, which claimed
that bankruptcy would result from collection of social se-
curity and unemployment taxes alleged to be incorrectly assessed
against it, 59 sought to enjoin the IRS from collecting the taxes. 6°
The prayer for injunctive relief was based on claims of irreparable
injury, resulting from lack of an adequate legal remedy, 61 and on
allegations that the IRS erred in assessing the taxes. 62 The legality
of the IRS actions turned 63 on whether certain fishermen were
employees within the meaning of the social security and unem-
ployment tax provisions of the Code." Without deciding the merits,
the Court held that a plaintiff seeking a pre-payment injunction
against tax collection must meet a two part test: (1) that traditional
equity jurisdiction exists because there is no adequate legal remedy,
and (2) that "it is clear that under no circumstances could the
Government ultimately prevail."65
Both Americans United and Bob Jones University had made
out a case for traditional equity jurisdiction on grounds of
threatened irreparable injury due to the lack of an adequate legal
remedy. 66
 The statutorily provided remedies of a suit for a refund of
taxes paid or for a deficiency assessment action in the Tax Court 67
58 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
58 Id, at 5.
n Id. at 2.
6L
 Id. at S.
63 Id. at 2.
63 Id. at 3.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 3111, 3301-11.
65 Enochs, 370 U.S. at 7,
66 "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d at 1172-73; Bob Jones Univ, v.
Connally, 472 F.2d 903, 906 (4th Cir. 1973).
67 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 7422 (civil actions for refunds), 6212-13 (authorization
of Tax Court deficiency actions); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(1) (1970) (district court and Court of
Claims jurisdiction over tax refund actions), 1491 (1970) (Court of Claims jurisdiction).
For a discussion of the statutorily authorized actions in federal district court, the Court of
Claims and the Tax Court, see 1 S. Surrey, W. Warren, P. McDaniel, & H. Ault, Federal
Income Taxation 70-85 (1972); Mills, Remedy Problems in Federal Civil Tax Litigation, 5
Ariz. L. Rev. 32 (1963). A donor could also utilize these procedures to challenge denial of
deductibility of a contribution to an organization. However, whether a donor has standing to
litigate an alleged violation of the donee's constitutional rights remains an open question. See
Americans United, 416 U.S. at 781 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), In Bob Jones Univ., the Court
did not reach the question whether in a refund suit successfully litigated by an organization
denied § 501(cX3) status, the district court might provide equitable relief to assure both the
future deductibility of contributions and the immunity of the organization from taxation. Bob
Jones Univ., 416 U S. at 748 n.22. The Court did note, however, that
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would not result in a favorable judgment until one or two years
after revocation of section 501(c)(3) status." During that period the
diversion of donors' resources to organizations retaining recognition
under section 170 would threaten ruin to an aggrieved organization
heavily dependent on such contributions. In light of the irreparable
injury attending the actions of the IRS, and the lack of adequate
legal remedies of the University and Americans United, the cases
presented controversies traditionally cognizable in equity and thus
satisfied the first part of the Enochs test."
The Supreme Court held that both organizations, however,
failed to meet the requirement of the second part of the Enochs
test: 70 the showing that under no circumstances could the govern-
ment prevail in the litigation. Citing Green v. Cannally, 71 in which
black students successfully challenged the prior IRS policy of ex-
tending section 501(c)(3) status to private segregationist schools, the
Court concluded that the University's "First Amendment, due pro-
cess, and equal protection contentions are sufficiently debatable to
foreclose any notion that 'under no circumstances could the Gov-
ernment ultimately prevail . . . "72
 The Court reversed in Ameri-
cans United without commenting on the substance of the constitu-
tional issues raised by that organization." Evidently, it regarded the
challenges by Americans United to be at least as debatable as the
University's.
In reaffirming its adherence to the Enochs test, the Court
there would be serious question about the reasonableness of a system that forced a
§ 501(cX3) organization to bring a series of backward looking refund suits in order to
establish repeatedly the legality of its claim to tax-exempt status and that precluded
such an organization from obtaining prospective relief even though it utilized an
avenue of review mandated by Congress.
Id. Such relief would, of course, be necessitated only by evidence of bad faith or arbitrariness
on the part of the IRS. An exhibition of bad faith by the IRS preceding and during trial has
prompted a district court in at least one case to provide injunctive relief, Center on Corp.
Responsibility, Inc. v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C. 1973). In that case the court
reasoned that because its judgment stood as a bar to further relitigation of the organization's
qualification for § 501(cX3) status, id. at 879, "there is no possibility that the government will
ultimately prevail on the exemption question as long as the Plaintiffs operations continue as
outlined in the amended application, [and] injunctive relief is essential to prevent irreparable
harm to the Plaintiff." Id. at 880. Once the question of § 501(cX3) status is res judicata, and
the plaintiff has made the requisite showing of eligibility for injunctive relief, the Enochs test,
see text at note 65 supra, has been satisfied. The court's reasoning also is compatible with the
Anti-Injunction Act's central purpose, viz., the avoidance of pre-collection judicial interfer-
ence by requiring litigants to follow the post-collection avenues of relief provided by statute.
See Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 748 n.22.
es
	 United, 416 U.S. at 778 (dissenting opinion).
" See text at note 65 supra.
" Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 748-49; Americans United, 416 U.S. at 763. See text at
note 65 supra.
71
 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
72
 Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 749, quoting Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation
Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
73 Americans United, 416 U.S. at 763.
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assumed that Enochs represented a return to the Court's original
interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act. 74 The Court also appeared
to accept the assumption in Enochs that the plain language of the
Act mandated virtually absolute withdrawal of jurisdiction to enter-
tain tax injunction actions. 75 These assumptions merit examination
in light of the Anti-Injunction Act's origins and of the Court's
interpretations of that statute.
When the Anti-Injunction Act was originally enacted in 1867,
two distinct rules governing equity's interference with tax collection
existed in the United States. 76 In a minority of the states, courts of
equity would entertain a prayer for injunctive relief where the
complainant alleged the illegality of the tax assessed, although the
illegality was required to be of a substantial nature. 77 However, in a
majority of the states and in the federal courts, a different rule
existed: equity would intervene prior to collection only where an
allegation of an illegal or unconstitutional assessment was coupled
with an allegation, such as fraud, apprehension of a multiplicity of
suits, or other grounds, sufficient to bring the case "within a recog-
nized head of equity jurisprudence." 78
Against this background the Anti-Injunction Act was enacted,
but without any discernible legislative history. 79 However, the logi-
cal effect of the Act was either: (1) to affirm the traditional equity
rule of the federal courts in derogation of the minority rule; or (2) to
establish a rule more stringent than that existing in the federal
courts. The Court has approved both constructions at varying
times. 8 ° It is doubtful, however, that the mere existence of a federal
rule, more stringent than the minority rule, without more, 81 is
sufficient to warrant the conclusion that Congress, in enacting the
Anti-Injunction statute, merely intended to reaffirm the settled fed-
eral rule. Moreover, it should be noted that the Judiciary Act of
178982 had supplied a legislative basis for the federal equity rule,
which provided equitable jurisdiction only in cases where the legal
remedy was inadequate. Moreover, the plain language of the Anti-
Injunction Act, which appears to establish an absolute bar to pre-
74 Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 744-45.
75 Id. at 736-37. See Enochs, 370 U.S. at 5.
76 4 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §§ 1779-81, at 4144-47 (4th ed. 1919).
77 E,g., Sweet v. Boyd, 6 Okla, 699, 713, 52 P. 939, 944 (1898).
78 E.g., Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 547, 549 (1873); Dows v.
Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108, 109-10 (1871).
79 Bob Jones Univ., 416 U S. at 736. For a description of a fruitless search for the Act's
origins, see Note, 49 Harv, L. Rev. 109 & n.9 (1935).
6° Compare Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine, 284 U.S. 498, 509 (1932), with Enochs v.
Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1962).
61 There appears to be no evidence that the federal courts in the 1860's had departed
from the majority rule. For example, Pomeroy, in an exhaustive listing of the nineteenth
century cases in point, cites no federal cases adhering to the minority rule. 4 J. Pomeroy,
supra note 48, § 1781 at 4147 n,3.
s2 Act of Sept. 24, 1789. ch, 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 82.
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collection suits to enjoin the assessment 'or collection of federal
taxes,83 militates against a theory of reaffirmation of the existing
practice. However, perhaps because of the unknown origins of the
Act and the difficulty of identifying the precise evil which Congress
sought to remedy in 1867, the Court, even in adopting the stringent
Enochs test, has never held that a literal reading of the statute is
required. Therefore, it appears that the Court in Bob Jones Univer-
sity and Americans United could have construed the Act in a
manner more responsive to cases where IRS administrative actions
threaten basic liberties."
The nineteenth century cases commenting on the Act provide
some support for a literal interpretation of the anti-injunction stat-
ute. In the 1876 State Railroad Tax Cases," the Supreme Court in
dicta commenting on the Anti-Injunction Act, gave an apparently
literal construction to the statute." Read together with the Court's
enthusiastic endorsement of the equity rule permitting jurisdiction
only in 'exceptional circumstances,87 however, the language of the
opinion supporting a literal construction of the Act seems somewhat
ambiguous.
In the 1883 case of Snyder v. Marks," the first case in which
the Act served as a basis of the decision, the Supreme Court strictly
construed the language of the Act. 89 However, the relevance of the
Court's reading of the statute in that case is unclear for the plaintiff
apparently did not allege90 the traditional basis of equitable relief
—irreparable injury due to the lack of an adequate legal remedy.
The authority of the Court's literal construction of the Act in
Snyder was seriously eroded by dicta in cases decided in 1916 and
1922. In Dodge v. Osborn 9 ' and Bailey v. George, 92 the Supreme
Court commented that an "extraordinary and . . exceptional cir-
cumstance" would create an exception to the Act's prohibition. 93
A showing of the required exceptional circumstance was made
in the next case decided under the Act, Hill v. Wallace. 94 There,
traders in grain futures were threatened with heavy criminal penal-
53 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7421(a). "[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court . . ." Id.
54
 The Court thereby would avoid the thorny question of whether where Congress has
purported to withdraw jurisdiction, the federal courts may exercise jurisdiction when the
Constitution appears to require the exercise of jurisdiction. See generally, H. Hart & H.
Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 330-75 (2d ed. 1973).
as 92 U.S. 575 (1876).
56
 Id. at 613.
87
 Id. at 614.
la 109 U.S. 189 (1883).
" Id. at 193.	 •
9°
 Id. at 190.
81 240 U.S. 118 (1916).
52
 259 U.S. 16 (1922).
53 Dodge, 240 U.S. at 122; Bailey, 259 U.S. at 20.
84
 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
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ties for failure to pay a federal tax alleged to be unconstitutional.
Furthermore, if each paid the tax, a multiplicity of suits would be
required to recover the tax payments." Since the equities were of
sufficient weight, the Court found that the exceptional circum-
stances, alluded to in Dodge, 96 authorized equitable jurisdiction and
held the tax unconstitutional."
The "extraordinary and exceptional circumstances" exception
reached full flower in 1932 in Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine
Co." In that case, the IRS sought to tax respondent's "Southern
Nut Product" under the Oleomargarine Act." Relying on decision
in cases involving other manufacturersm and holding that the in-
gredients found in "Southern Nut Product" were not taxable as
oleomargarine," 1 the district court had imposed an injunction
against the collector. 1 °2 The Supreme Court sustained the injunc-
tion, concluding that
the enforcement of the [Oleomargarine] Act against re-
spondent would be arbitrary and oppressive, would de-
stroy its business, ruin it financially and inflict loss for
which it would have no remedy at law. It is clear that, by
reason of the special and extraordinary facts and circum-
stances, [the Anti-Injunction Act] does not apply. 1 ° 3
The Court noted that the Anti-Injunction Act merely constituted an
affirmation of the equity rule applied by the federal courts in
1867. 1 °4 Justices Stone and Brandeis dissented, on the basis of their
belief that the Anti-Injunction Act required and absolute bar to
equitable jurisdiction . 1 ° 5
Standard Nut remained the authoritative interpretation of the
Act for thirty years. In 1962, however, the plaintiff in Enochs v.
Williams Packing & Navigation Co. 106 claimed that collection of
taxes allegedly not owed would bankrupt it. 107 The Court narrowed
55 Id. at 62.
56 259 U.S. at 20,
97 Hill, 259 U.S. at 62, 68-72.
95 284 U.S. 498 (1932).
99 Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 784, 32 Stat. 193, amending Act of Aug. 2, 1886, ch. 840, 24
Stat, 209, as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 4591 et seq. (1970).
100 E.g., Higgins Mfg. Co. v. Page, 297 F. 644 - (D.R.I. 1924).
IOU See Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 49 F.2d 79, 80-83 (5th Cir. 1931). The
opinion and order of the district court are unpublished.
102 Id. at 80.
1 °5 284 U.S. at 510-11.
"4
 Id. at 509.
1 ° 5 Id. at 511 (dissenting opinion).
"° 370 U.S, 1 (1962).
"7 The Court seemed to doubt the corporation's claim of impending bankruptcy:
Attempting to establish a basis for equitable jurisdiction, the corporation maintains
that it will be thrown into bankruptcy if required to pay the entire assessment of
$41,568.57. It is undisputed that Williams itself is without available funds in this
amount, but the Government suggests that respondent has denuded itself of assets in
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the extraordinary circumstances test by adding a requirement that
the government's claim to the taxes be so baseless as to be an
"exaction" in "the guise of tax."'" The existing requirement was
merely that traditional grounds for equity jurisdiction be shown.
However, the application of the stricter test requiring a show-
ing that under no circumstances can the government prevail was left
unclear. The Court in Enochs stated that
the question of whether the Government has a chance of
ultimately prevailing is to be determined on the basis of the
information available to it at the time of suit. Only if it is
then apparent that, under the most liberal view of the law
and the facts, the United States cannot establish its claim,
may the suit for an injunction be maintained.' 09
However, the Court assumed that the Enochs test was not inconsis-
tent with the holding of Standard Nut. 10 Yet Standard Nut re-
quired, inter alia, rather technical factual determinations concern-
ing the product's ingredients and a studied interpretation of the
Oleomargarine Act's provisions."' These issues were resolved in
favor of the plaintiff corporation only after issuance of a temporary
injunction and a trial on the merits." 2
Realistically, application of the Enochs test will require dismis-
sal of any suit for injunctive relief where a factual dispute exists, or
where the law is at all unclear. Thus, without regard to the actual
merits in any case, it affords taxpayers equitable relief only in
instances of the most egregious abuses of power by the IRS. In light
of the obscure origins of the Act and the Court's varying interpreta-
tions of it over the past century, it is submitted that the insensitive
stringency of the Enochs test is not, in all cases, required by history
or logic.
IV. INFRINGEMENT OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS: THE
POSSIBILITY OF EXPANSION OF THE EXCEPTION
TO THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
The rigidity of the Enochs test raises serious constitutional
questions. The denial of a judicial forum for the resolution of
disputes where IRS administrative actions operate to stifle funda-
anticipation of its tax liability, that DeJean's assets should be considered as belong-
ing to respondent, and that, in any event, the respondent corporation may pay the
assessment for a single quarter and then sue for a refund.
370 U.S. at 5. Instead of remanding for a clearer factual determiniation of the irreparable
injury alleged by the respondent, the Court reversed under its new interpretation of the
Anti-Injunction Act. Id. at S.
1 °' Id. at 7.
1 ° 9 Id.
"a Id.
"' Standard Nut, 284 U.S. at 506-08.
112 Id. at 502-03.
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mental rights presents an apparent conflict with settled principles of
due process. Applying the Enochs test, the Supreme Court, how-
ever, dismissed Bob Jones University's contention that the require-
ment that it seek redress only through administrative or judical
refund actions violated due process. " 3 It reasoned that these proce-
dures offered "petitioner a full, albeit delayed, opportunity to liti-
gate the legality of the Service's [actions]. " 14 The irreparable in-
juries visited on the University by the withdrawal of equitable
jurisdiction did "not rise to the level of constitutional infirmities, in
light of the powerful governmental interests in protecting the ad-
ministration of the tax system from premature judicial interference
.. and of the opportunities for review that are available." 15 The
Court did not consider whether fulfillment of due process require-
ments should require creation of exceptions where there existed the
possibility of IRS encroachment on the First Amendment rights of
the University.
Established principles of procedural due process appear to sup-
port a conclusion that the arguably unconstitutional IRS infringe-
ments on First Amendment liberties in Bob Jones University and
Americans United merited creation of a test more flexible than
Enochs to permit equitable relief pending judicial resolution of the
constitutional issues. Where only economic ruin is threatened by an
IRS withdrawal of exemption and deductibility privileges, a scheme
affording relief only through a refund suit would not seem to violate
taxpayer's constitutional rights. However, where an allegation of
impending economic ruin resulting from the absence of a legal
remedy is joined by a substantial showing that the IRS actions
violate a recognized fundamental right, it is submitted that due
process appears to demand an interpretation of the Anti-Injunction
Act which would shield such a case from its scope.
The scope of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth" 8 and
Fourteenth Amendments" 7 is necessarily fluid due to the broad
range of governmental actions subject to the clauses and the diverse
interests subject to governmental infringement. In addition to per-
sonal or real property threatened by governmental taking, 18 the
constitutional guarantees of due process extend to such
'entitlements" as unemployment' 20 and welfare benefits,' 21 au-
'' Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. at 725, 746-48 (1974).
14 Id. at 746.
"5 Id, at 747.
'" U.S. Const. amend. V.
"7 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, * 1.
1 " For a discussion of the requirements of due process where property rights are
threatened see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-82 (1972).
" g Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970). Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, implied that any statutory "entitlement" of an economic nature was "property" within
the meaning of the Due Process Clause. Id.
IN See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
" I
 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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tomobile drivers licenses, 122 public employment,' 23 social security
benefits,' 24 and tax exemptions.' 25
 Rights of liberty protected by
due process include those interests recognized as "fundamental,"
ranging from the right to marry 126 to the right of free speech.' 27
"The right to a prior hearing,"' 28 before governmental depriva-
tion of life, liberty or property is recognized as the "fundamental
requisite" 129 of due process. The nature of the hearing may vary,
"depending upon the importance of the interests involved. . . ."' 3 °
The hearing must, however, be "at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner," 131
 focusing, at least, upon the proposed depri-
vation's furtherance of a legitimate state interest.' 32 The specific
requirements of the hearing, e.g., formality and the opportunity for
judicial review, evolve from a classic balancing test: the gravity of
the individual's threatened loss is weighed against "the government
interest in summary adjudication." 133 As the balance shifts in favor
of the individual, the procedural safeguards must necessarily in-
crease. 134
In a case where the governent interest is sufficiently compelling,
the hearing requirement may be suspended "until after the
event." 135 For example, the state's interest in public health out-
weighs property rights. Thus, seizure without a hearing of mis-
labeled vitamin products' 36 or food unfit for human consumption' 37
is permitted. In the area of federal taxation, as the Court has stated,
the "paramount" right of the IRS "to exact immediate payment and
to relegate the taxpayer to a suit for recovery" 138 ordinarily eclipses
122 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
123 Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
124 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960).
125 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
326 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
127
 E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
128 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 (1972).
129 Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
130 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
132 See Burson, 402 U.S. at 541.
133 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63.
134 Speiser, .357 U.S. at 520-21.
135
 Boddie, 401 U.S. at 379.
136 Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599-600 (1950).
137 North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 320 (1908).
138 Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 599 (1931). It should be noted, however,
that present IRS practices preceding revocation of § 501(c)(3) status or advance assurance of
deductibility under § 170 provide considerably more procedural safeguards than the draconian
tax collection system contemplated by the Phillips Court. Prior to loss of § 501(c)(3) privileges,
an aggrieved organization will be notified and allowed to protest in writing to the District
Director. Rev. Proc. 72-4, § 11.02, 1972-1, Cum. Bull. 706, 708. If the District Director's
ruling is adverse, the proposed action is removed to the National Office and treated as a
request for technical advice. Rev. Proc. 72-4, § 11.04, 1972-1 Cum. Bull. 709. At the National
Office, the organization may file a written statement and have at least one conference. Rev.
Proc. 72-2, §§ 4.05-4.06, 1972-1 Cum. Bull. 695, 696. Where the District Director discovers
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the traditional requirement of a prior hearing: "Where only property
rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not
a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for the ultimate
judicial determination of the liability is adequate." 139
Where, 'however, the governmental interest in summary pro-
ceedings is insufficient, due process requires a hearing before the
individual interest is foreclosed or infringed. For example, a state's
financial interest in economy must yield to a welfare recipient's right
to a hearing before termination of benefits, even if unrecoverable
sums are consequently paid for a short period to ineligible per-
sons)" Similarly, the governmental interest in removing negligent
drivers from the road unless they post security for damages claimed
by aggrieved parties does not excuse the denial of a presuspension
hearing, focused on negligence, to the accused licensee. 141 Where
mere property interests are affected by taxation, the due process
requirement of an administrative hearing appears to be satisfied by
the internal hearing procedures afforded by the IRS) 42 However,
judicial review of the final decision is not required by the
Constitution. 143
It is suggested that due process does require provision of a
judicial forum to resolve those cases in which administrative actions
constitute a restraint on the exercise of the fundamental rights of
free expression or free exercise of religion. These more rigid re-
quirements have been imposed in cases dealing with the censorship
or seizure of allegedly obscene materials and with restraints on their
dissemination through the mail) 44 In such cases, any "final re-
straint," e.g., where a film is "enjoined from exhibition or
threatened with destruction," 145 may be effected only after an ad-
versary judicial proceeding. 146 Any temporary restraint "imposed in
advance of a final judicial determination on the merits similarly
must be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest
"serious doubt concerning the continued qualification of the organization to receive deductible
contributions" and intends to revoke advance assurance of deductibility to contributors, the
affected organization is guaranteed immediate notice. Rev. Proc. 72-39, § 4.05, 1972-2 Cum.
Bull. 818, 819. Unless "time is critical," allowing only an oral protest, the Director is required
to allow up to ten days for written protest and a conference. Rev. Proc. 72-39, § 4.06, 1972-2
Cum. Bull. 818, 819. Thereafter, the organization has a right to a conference at the National
Office. Rev. Proc. 72-39, § 4.08, 1972-2 Cur in. Bull, 818, 819.
139
 Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. .589, 596-97 (1931).
10 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-66 (1970).
141 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1971).
" 2 See note 138 supra.
13 See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973),
1 " E.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410
(1971).
143
 Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 490 (1973).
146
 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). In Freedman, the Court ruled that a
state censorship board's powers to prohibit the exhibition of allegedly obscene motion pictures
offended the Constitution. Id.
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flied period compatible with sound judicial resolution." 147 Further-
more, no temporary restraint may be imposed where a less restric-
tive alternative course is available to the state.'" Thus it is estab-
lished that judicial participation is an essential element of any at-
tempted restraint of free expression: "We have tolerated such a
system [of prior restraint] only where it operated under judicial
superintendence and assured an almost immediate judicial determi-
nation of the validity of the restraint." 149 Applying this principle to
administrative tax proceedings, it is submitted that agency decisions
which threaten a substantial infringement of First Amendment or
other fundamental rights should similarly be exposed to prompt
judicial review. Where the delay attending relief through a refund
suit will extinguish or seriously hamper the exercise of the rights in
question, such delayed judicial proceedings would not appear con-
stitutionally adequate according to the principles of due process
developed by the Supreme Court. It would appear that due process
requires that the Court's strict interpretation of the Anti-Injunction
Act yield to permit equitable relief.
In determining whether judicial review should have been avail-
able in Bob Jones University or Americans United the first question
is whether the IRS revocation of section 501(c)(3) status infringed on
First Amendment rights. It does not appear that because a tax
exemption may be termed a matter of legislative grace, 15° its re-
moval, however arbitrary, is insulated from the demands of due
process or cannot operate to infringe constitutional rights."' "[T]he
147
 Id. at 59.
145
 Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 492.93 (1973) (copies of a seized film must be
made available to an exhibitor if none are otherwise available to him).
Similar procedural safeguards have been erected where the Postal Service sought to deny
use of the mails for distribution of allegedly obscene literature. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410
(1971). Only procedures containing "built-in safeguards against curtailment of constitutionally
protected expression," id. at 416, would satisfy the requirements of the Constitution.
Moreover, the prior restraint administratively imposed must be minimal, id. at 417, with the
Postal Service obligated to initiate prompt judicial review of its action. Id.
The safeguards surrounding police or postal actions against allegedly obscene materials
reflect the preferred position of First Amendment rights in the hierarchy of constitutional
values. They are paralleled in other proceedings where state action threatens First Amend-
ment rights. In Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court held that the
doctrine requiring federal courts to abstain from enjoining the initiation of state criminal
proceedings was inapplicable where "statutes are justifiably attacked on their face as abridg-
ing free expression or as applied for the purpose of discouraging protected activities." Id. at
489-90. (The grounds for federal intervention were narrowed in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971).) In Carroll v. President & Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968),
the Court ruled that ex parte temporary restraining orders curtailing the right of assembly
may not issue except where "it is impossible to serve or to notify the opposing parties and to
give them an opportunity to participate." Id. at 180.
144
 Bantam Books, Inc. v, Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
3 " See Cammarano v. United States, .358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959) (concurring opinion).
171 Such an argument failed to insulate procedures for determining eligibility for welfare
benefits from the requirements of due process: "Such benefits are a matter of statutory
entitlement for persons qualified to receive them. Their termination involves state action that
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fact that no direct restraint or punishment is imposed upon speech
or assembly does not determine the free speech question. Under
some circumstances, indirect `discouragements' undoubtedly have
the same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment
rights as imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes." 152
If the IRS denies a tax exemption because an organization has
exercised a First Amendment right, such denial appears to consti-
tute an infringement of that right. However, where the deprivation
is imposed because of conduct unrelated to free expression, but has
an incidental effect of curtailing free expression, First Amendment
rights are not violated. 153 In light of this distinction, the IRS actions
in Bob Jones University and Americans United may be recognized,
prima facie, as curtailments of First Amendment liberties: 154 in Bob
Jones University because the school's tax-exempt status was
threatened with revocation, a penalty prompted by the institution's
exercise of a sincere religious belief; in Americans United because
the IRS actions penalized the organization's constitutionally pro-
tected right to lobby.
The impact of the IRS actions' on First Amendment rights is
not limited to the chilling effect associated with loss of each
plaintiff's shield against its own tax liability. To the extent that
revocation of section 501(c)(3) tax -exempt status diverts contribu-
tions, it operates as a direct financial restraint on the exercise of the
First Amendment liberties by the organization. Therefore, it is a
form of prior restraint comparable to the restraint accomplished by
denial of access to the mailst 55 or denial of a license to show an
allegedly obscene film. 156 Prior restraint of First Amendment rights
ordinarily requires prompt judicial resolution of the dispute,'" such
adjudicates important rights. The constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argu-
ment that public assistance benefits are 'a "privilege" and not a "right." ' " Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
' 52
 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950).
' 53 E.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682-83 (1972).
[T]he First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press
that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general applica-
bility. . . . [O]therwise valid laws serving substantial public interests may be
enforced against the press as against others, despite the possible burden that may be
imposed.
Id. at 682-83. "It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is
quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon." Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943). See also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233, 250 (1936) (taxes levied generally on enterprises, including the press, raise no constitu-
tional problems).
154 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958). "It cannot be gainsaid that a
discriminatory denial of a tax exemption for engaging in speech is a limitation on free speech.
. . To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to
penalize them for such speech." Id.
155 Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971).
L56
 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
157 See text at notes 144-49 supra.
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as would be provided by an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act to
create jurisdiction for injunctive relief.
Assuming that Bob Jones University and Americans United
had established, prima facie, IRS infringement of their First
Amendment rights, only a "sufficient countervailing justification"' 58
would "justify a.short-cut procedure which must inevitably result in
suppressing protected speech."'" Although the weight assigned to
the governmental objective to be achieved at the expense of the
fundamental right in question is necessarily subjectively measured,
strict scrutiny is aided by a "less restrictive alternative" analysis:
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of . . .
abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose.'"
The Constitution then, requires an examination of how compelling
the asserted state interest is in light of alternatives available for
achieving the same end.
The interest asserted by the IRS in seeking to shield its ad-
ministrative determinations from pre-collection judicial interference
is the need to assure the United States "of prompt collection of its
lawful revenue," 161 and to protect "the collector from litigation
pending a suit for refund." 162
 Except to the extent that the latter
reason is a restatement of the former, it is difficult to conceive why
the collector should stand on a footing different from any other
federal official subject to judicial scrutiny. Concededly, there is a
strong governmental interest in freedom from judicial interference
with the tax collection process. The Court in 1876 flatly stated that
"[i)f there existed in the courts, State or National, any general power
of impeding or controlling the collection of taxes, . . . the very
existence of the government might be placed in the power of a
hostile judiciary."'" Scarely retreating from this nineteenth century
assertion, the Court in 1931 noted that "the right of the United
States to exact immediate payment and to relegate the taxpayer to a
suit for recovery, is paramount." 164
 The Court in both Enochi165
158
 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971). In Boddie, the Court held that
Connecticut violated due process in denying indigents, who could not pay a filing fee, access
to its courts to exercise their right of divorce. Id.
139 Speiser v. Randall, .357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958).
160
 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); accord, Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296-97
(1961).
161
 Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
162
 Id. at 8.
' 63
 Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85, 89 (1876).
164
 Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 599 (1931).
' 63 See Enochs, 370 U.S. at 7.
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and in Bob Jones University' 66 recognized the government interest
in freedom from judicial interference in pre-tax collection proce-
dures as superior to an organization's interest in escaping from "a
precarious financial position." 167
It is submitted that the Court's unquestioning assumption that
the government's interest in precollection immunity from all judicial
interference is paramount, ignores the question of whether a less
restrictive alternative, permitting pre-collection equitable relief
only in exceptional cases, would not protect the treasury equally
well. The Court's apparently unquestioning acceptance of the
government's asserted interest appears to compromise its commit-
ment "searchingly [to] examine the interests that the State seeks to
promote" where in conflict with fundamental rights.'"
A serious threat to the revenues would exist where a broadly
drawn exception to the Anti-Injunction Act would invite a mul-
titude of suits hampering the tax collection machinery. However, a
narrow exception, permitting injunctive relief only where a substan-
tial constitutional question involving an encroachment on First
Amendment rights is combined with a showing of irreparable harm,
would not result in a severe disruptive effect upon the tax collection
system. Where the plaintiff's own tax liability is at issue, the
government's interest in the fiscal integrity of the treasury is not
seriously jeopardized by requiring it to postpone collection until
after the litigation. Indeed, certain delays are authorized by statute
to preserve the status quo while the Tax Court tries a deficiency
assessment action.'" It is difficult to discern how the effect of a Tax
Court injunction on the government's "paramount interest" differs
in any significant respect from the impact of a federal district court
injunction. 170
Moreover, where a third-party donor's taxes would be irre-
trievably lost during the period of injunctive relief, or where
the plaintiff's solvency is in question, an alternative to denial of the
availability of injunctive relief could be a requirement that the
plaintiff post a bond to assure the government's eventual collection
of taxes owed."' While a bonding requirement may prove burden-
1 " 416 U.S. at 747.
167 Id.
1 " Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
169
 Int, Rev. Code of 1954, 4 6213(a).
1 " Furthermore, it is difficult to understand how a state's interest in the integrity of its
treasury is substantially less compelling than Federal Government's interest in the integrity of
its revenues; yet New York's interest in denying funds to ineligible persons was held inferior
to a welfare recipient's right to a hearing before removal from the rolls. Goldberg v, Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 2& (1970).
171 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c) provides that "info restraining order or preliminary injunction
shall issue except upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems
proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any
party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained."
For an earlier case in which the Court required a bond as a condition of temporary
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some to some plaintiffs, it is certainly less so than the present
scheme resulting in certain loss of contributions. Moreover, where
the legal questions are novel a bond seems a fair accommodation of
the interests of the two parties in light of the uncertain outcome of
the litigation.
Assuming that an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act should
be permitted where the probability of irreparable injury and a
substantial question involving fundamental rights are presented in
the same case, it is submitted that Bob Jones University and Ameri-
cans United are cases appropriate for application of such an excep-
tion. In Bob Jones University the threatened economic deprivation
penalized the University's exercise of an evidently sincere, if eccen-
tric, religious belief that racial segregation was divinely ordained. In
Americans United the revocation penalized the organization's First
Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances. If the Uni-
versity sought to challenge the IRS threatened revocation of tax-
exempt status on grounds independent of the free exercise of reli-
gion, it is doubtful that a substantial constitutional claim would be
present. While the associational interest in private education is
protected against state encroachment,'" it seems clear that the
federal government's interest in avoiding support for institutions
established to promote segregated education would be sufficiently
important to justify a tax classification discriminating against seg-
regationist private schools.'"
Where the protected associational interest is coupled with an
interest in the free exercise of religion, a difficult question is pre-
sented. Perhaps, as the court in Green v. Connally 174 stated,
[t]here is a compelling as well as a reasonable government
interest in the interdiction of racial discrimination which
stands on the highest constitutional ground, taking into
account the provisions and penumbra of the Amendments
passed in the wake of the Civil War. That government
interest is dominant over other constitutional interests to
injunctive relief against tax collection, see Hill v. Wallace, 257 U.S. 615, 616 (1921). For a
discussion of bonding requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c), see 7 Moore's Fed'l Practice
if 65.09 (2d ed. 1974).
In
 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
113
 For a discussion of the constitutional issues presented by such a case, see Green v.
Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1165-69 (D.D.C.), afPd mem. sub nom. Colt v. Green, 404
U.S. 997 (1971). See also Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1945) (associational
liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may be infringed by state anti-
discrimination legislation because of the Amendment's overiding concern with the elimination
of racial discrimination). Cf. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (state's supplying of
free textbooks to private schools practicing racial discrimination violates the Fourteenth
Amendment).
174
 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub. nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997
(1971).
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the extent that there is complete and unavoidable
conflict.' 75
It is not to be denied that the interest in eliminating racial discrimi-
nation is of the highest national concern. But the Court has never
held that the wall between church and state may be breached to
permit government regulation of a church's racial policies. Nor has
the Court decided whether denial of a tax exemption to a church
composed of members of one racial group would be the constitu-
tional equivalent of such regulation. And where a religious
organization's racial beliefs manifest themselves in the exercise of a
function as intimately associated with religion as religious educa-
tion
'
 it is uncertain whether a tax classification necessarily burden-
ing that type of religious exercise is justifiable. 176
The great deference accorded by the Court to religious practices
in conflict with important state interests was vividly reflected in
Wisconsin v. Yoder.'" In that case, the State's interest in insuring
that all children receive an adequate education was not of sufficient
constitutional weight to justify requiring Amish children, in viola-
tion of their religious beliefs, to attend public school after the eighth
grade.'" In Bob Jones University, however, the governmental in-
terference with the religious exercise was perhaps less invidious and
direct than in Yoder. Moreover, because the interference, the with-
holding of indirect support, goes no further than necessary to pro-
mote the important goal of disassociating the United States from all
forms of racial discrimination, it is likely that the proposed revoca-
tion of section 501(c)(3) status was not unconstitutional. However, it
is submitted that the question was sufficiently novel and uncertain
to have justified the district court's assumption of equitable jurisdic-
tion under an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.
In Americans United the constitutional question presented was
whether an otherwise qualifying organization may be denied tax-
exempt status when a significant portion of its activities enters the
constitutionally protected area of lobbying.'" The Court has never
175 330 F. Supp. at 1167.
In
 Cf. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964) (state's
interests in prohibiting the use of hallucinogens were insufficient to permit the prosecution of
Indians using peyote in a bona fide religious ritual). But cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1878) (government's interest in protecting democratic institutions, morals and social
well-being overrode Mormons' religious interest in practicing polygamy),
177
 406 U.S. 205 (1972),
176
 Id. at 228-29.
179
 The claim by Americans United that the lobbying proscription of * 501(c)(3) violates
equal protection because large organizations are thereby permitted to engage in more lobbying
than small organizations seems insubstantial. The Supreme Court appears to have rejected
contentions that discriminations based solely on wealth are invidious. See San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660
(1973).
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confronted this question directly.'" It appears logical, however,
that the IRS revocation of Americans United's tax-exempt status
should be regarded as an infringement on First and Fifth Amend-
ment liberties. Threatened loss of section 501(c)(3) status for engag-
ing in certain types of constitutionally protected activities has a
strong deterrent effect on the exercise of the protected right."'
Moreover, deprivation of a governmental benefit which penalizes
the exercise of a fundamental right may violate equal protection.' 82
In determining whether the IRS action against Americans
United was constitutional, an examination of the government's
rationale in denying exemptions to organizations substantially in-
volved in lobbying is required. The government's policy, as enun-
ciated by the Tenth Circuit, is based on the conviction "that the
United States Treasury should be neutral in political affairs and that
substantial activities directed to attempts to influence legislation or
Is° In Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), taxpayers claimed that denial
of a business expense deduction for lobbying costs violated their First Amendment rights. Id.
at 512-13, The Court refused to find a First Amendment issue:
Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they engage in constitution-
ally protected activities, but are simply being required to pay for those activities
entirely out of their own pockets . . . Nondiscriminatory denial of deduction from
gross income to sums expended to promote or defeat legislation is plainly not
"'aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.' "
Id. at 513. Cammarano is distinguishable from Americans United on several grounds. At issue
in Cammarano was the question of whether lobbying costs were "ordinary and necessary"
business expenses within the meaning of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(a)(1)(A). Id. at 499.
Despite the Court's evident belief that First Amendment rights were unaffected, the IRS
interpretation of the Code which excluded lobbying expenses from that classification penalized
the exercise of free expression in behalf of the enterprise. However, unlike the penalty in
Americans United where no commercial interests underlay the organization's lobbying activ-
ity, the IRS actions in Cammarano penalized only expression in behalf of a business, an
interest evidently unprotected by the First Amendment. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52, 54 (1942). Moreover, the denial of a tax exemption for organizations engaged in
lobbying, as in Americans United, goes well beyond the denial of a deduction, a penalty
co-extensive with the government's interest in avoiding support for lobbying activities. Where
tax-exempt status is revoked, all tax benefits are lost although the lobbying efforts constituted
only a portion of the organization's overall activities. Finally, the penalty in Cammarano was
of only minor impact on the petitioners' business enterprises. See 358 U.S. at 501-02.
Americans United, which was organized for non-commercial purposes, was placed in grave
financial condition by the IRS actions. "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169,
1172-73 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Given the larger quantitative impact of the IRS actions in Americans United and the
clearer penalization of protected activities, a test more stringent than the rational justification
analysis adopted in Cammarano, see 358 U.S. at 513, should be applied. See also Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). "[D]enial of a tax exemption for engaging in speech is a
limitation on free speech." Id. at 518.
18'
	
Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518.
162 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). "[A]ny classification which serves to
penalize the exercise of [a fundamental] right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." id. (emphasis in original). In Shapiro,
the Court held that one year residency requirements for welfare eligibility unconstitutionally
infringed on the appellees' fundamental rights of interstate travel. Id. at 638.
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affect a political campaign should not be subsidized."'" The Su-
preme Court has yet to attach constitutional weight to this interest.
And it has yet to determine what level of invidiousness is reached by
tax classifications which infringe on fundamental rights. Until it
does so, the First Amendment claims raised in Americans United
remain novel and troubling, and it would seem that sufficiently
substantial constitutional question exists to justify an exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act.
Nonetheless, the Stipreme Court's unwillingness to depart from
the rigid and clumsy test enunciated in Enochs leaves tax-exempt
organizations virtually without a remedy in the face of potentially
arbitrary infringements of their First Amendment rights. Given
Enochs' virtual foreclosure of access to a precollection remedy even
where basic liberties are threatened with destruction, it is submitted
that the Anti-Injunction Act should have been interpreted as permit-
ting injunctive relief where a substantial constitutional question
involving fundamental rights is coupled with a showing of irrepara-
ble injury.
RICHARD J. SHEA
Trade Secrets—Federal Patent Law Preemption of State Trade
Secret Law—Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.'—Harshaw Chem-
ical, a subsidiary of plaintiff, Kewanee Oil Co., completed a sixteen
year research program which produced the first seventeen-inch
sodium iodide thallium crystal ever manufactured in the United
States. 2 The crystal is used for the detection of ionizing radiation.
The manufacture of the seventeen-inch crystal represented a
significant advancement in the field. 3 Three years after the produc-
tion of the first seventeen-inch crystal, Bicron Corporation, the
defendant, was formed by three former Harshaw employees, all of
whom had been involved in the research program. Within nine
months, Bicron had produced its first seventeen-inch crystal. 4 The
183 Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 854 (10th Cir.
1972) (emphasis deleted).
1
 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (5-3 majority).
2
 Id. at 473. While Harshaw was not alone in its interest in growing sodium iodide
thalium crystals, no other research team had been able to grow a 17-inch crystal. See Brief for
Petitioner at 5-6, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), reprinted in 7 Trade
Reg. Law Reprints (no. 3a) 43 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Law Reprints]; Brief for Respondent
at 5-6, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), reprinted in Law Reprints,
supra, at 121.
3 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074, 1076 (6th Cir. 1973).
4 416 U.S. at 473.
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